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Conscience and Citizenship: The Primacy
of Conscience for Catholics in Public Life
Gregory Kalscheur, S.J.
In their statement, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship,1
the U.S. bishops acknowledge that "the responsibility to make choices
in political life rests with each individual in light of a properly formed
conscience.,bishops go on to acknowledge, quoting the Catechism
of the Catholic Church, that in all an individual says and does, he is
obliged to follow faithfully what he knows to be just and right.3 The
Catechism itself further explains that "[a] human being must always -,-
obey the certain judgment of his conscience. If he were deliberately to
act against it, he would condemn hiroself." Similarly, in his 1993 encyc-
lical, Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II stated that a human being "must
act in accordance with [the judgment of conscience]. Ifman acts against
this judgment or, in a case where he lacks certainty about the rightness
and goodness of a determined act, still performs that act, he sta,nds
condemned by his own conscience, the proximate norm of personal
morality.,,4 These principles taken together are an expression of the
idea known for centuries in the Catholic tradition as the primacy of
conscience.5
Before going any further, however, it is important to acknowledge
that ",[c]onscience' is [a] word ... often used but little understood.,,6
Gregory Kalscheur, S.J. is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School.
1 Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship: The U.S. Bishops'Reflection on Cath-
olic Teaching and Political Life, 37 ORIGINS 389 (Nov. 29, 2007) [hereinafter FCFC].
2Id. at 390, 'Il7.
3 Id. at 392, 'Il17 (quoting CCC #1778).
4 John Paul II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 'Il60.
5 See Brian Lewis, The Primacy of Conscience in the Roman Catholic 'l.radition, 13
PACIFICA 299, at 307 (2000). See also Joseph Koterski, S.J., Conscience and Catholic
Politicians (Part 1) (Zenit interview, April 11, 2006), available at http://www.zenit.org/
article-15772?l=english ("[T]he Church has long recognized the primacy of conscience,
so long as one understands the term properly. It is not just that one may obey one's
conscience, but that one must do so - but, first, one must form one's conscience cor-
rectly.").
6 RICHARD M. GULA, S.S., REAsON INFORMED By FAITH: FOUNDATIONS OF CATHOLIC
MORALITY 123 (1989).
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For tbis reason, I want at the outset to emphasize what conscience and
the primacy of conscience do not mean in the Catholic tradition. AB the
bishops note in their Forming Consciences statement, "[clonscience is
not something that allows us to justify doing whatever we want nor is it
a mere 'feeling' about what we should or should not do.,,7 In a 1991
address entitled "Conscience and Truth," Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger
(now Pope Benedict XVI) explained that conscience is degraded into a
mechanism for rationalization if it is understood simply as one's subjec-
tive certainty and lack of doubt about a moral question.s Similarly,
when we talk about the primacy of conscience, we do not mean that
people have a right to do whatever they want, or that there are no
objective norms of morality.
Any proper understanding of the primacy of conscience needs to be
rooted in an authentically Catholic understanding of conscience itself.
The Catholic tradition insists that both conscience and the primacy of
conscience must be understood in relationsbip to truth: there is objec-
tive moral truth and the human person is capable of apprehending that
truth. As Cardinal Ratzinger explained in bis 1991 address, to reduce
conscience to subjective certitude is to retreat from truth. 9
In section 17 of the Forming Consciences statement, the bishops give
us a brief statement explaining what conscience is. They begin by
drawing on Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World to describe conscience as "the voice of God resounding
in the human heart, revealing the truth to us and calling us to do what
is good while shunning what is evil." They then go on to explain that
"conscience is a judgment of reason whereby the human person recog-
nizes the moral quality of a concrete act that he is going to perform, is
in the process. of performing, or has already completed."
Tbis summary description shows that conscience is a concept with
several different dimensions. Most fundamentally, conscience is a basic
characteristic of the Catholic understanding ofwhat it is to be a human
person: to be human is to possess a basic orientation to know and to do
the true and the good. To be human is to possess a basic capacity to
recognize the true and the good and to recognize that one must act in
accordance with the true and the good. At the same time, the Catholic
understanding of conscience also includes the process of discernment
7 FCFC'lI17.
8 Joseph Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, in ON CONSCIENCE at 17, 21-22 (National
Catholic Bioethics Center, 2007).
9Id. at 22.
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and moral reasoning by which we recognize what acting in accord with
the true and the good demands of us in particular concrete situations.
Finally, conscience refers to the judgment of what "I must do" in the
particular situation. IO When our conscience determines that a particu-
lar action is in accord with the true and the good, which is another way
of saying that the action is a response to God's objective call, then this
action is morally required of us. 11. In the words of Thomas Aquinas,
when a person's reason proposes something as being God's command,
slighting the dictate of reason amounts to slighting the law of GOd.12
This understanding of conscience is a central part of the teaching of
Vatican II on the dignity of the human person. One of the key texts is
section 16 of the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World. Here is how that conciliar text describes the dignity of the moral,;
conscience:
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon
himself, but which holds him to _obedience. Always summoning him to love good
and avoid evil, the voice of conscience can when necessary speak to his heart more
specifically: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God. To
obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged.
The Catholic understanding of conscience also plays a decisive role in
Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Freedom. The Council there
emphasized the relationship between conscience and truth:
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons - that is, as beings endowed with
reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility - that
all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation
to seek the truth. . .. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known,
and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands oftruth. 13 ... Wherefore
man has the duty, and therefore the right, to seek the truth ... in order that he
may with prudence form for himselfright and true judgments of conscience, under
use of all suitable means.... [A]s the truth is discovered, it is by a personal assent
that men are to adhere to it.
On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law
through the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his
conscience in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of his life. It
fonows that he is not to be forced toact in a manner contrary to his conscience.
. 10 For a discussion of the various dimensions of conscience, see GULA, REASON IN-
FORMED BY FAITH, 131-33; Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, at 32-37; Anthony Fisher,
Conscience and Authority, Zenit ZE07030301, auaila.bZe at http://www.zenit.org/article-
19058?l=english.
11 GULA, supra note 6, at 133.
12 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGlCA I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5.
13 Documents of Vatican II, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 'lI2.
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Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his
consciep.ce, especially in matters religious.14
I've quoted these documents of Vatican II at some length for two rea-
sons: First, to show how crucial maintaining the connection between
conscience and truth is to any authentically Catholic understanding
of conscience. Second, to show how prominent a place the tradition
gives to primacy of conscience properly understood.
The Declaration on Religious Freedom clearly states that to be a hu-
man person is to have a moral obligation to seek the truth. Moreover, to
be a human person is to have a duty to seek the truth in order that one
can form for oneselfright and true judgments of conscience. As one seeks
the truth, one is bound to adhere to the truth as it is known and one is
bound to order one's life in accord with the demands of truth. In all our
activity we are bound to follow our conscience. This is what it means to
speak of the primacy of conscience. This affirmation of the primacy of
conscience should not be lightly disregarded. Pay attention to these
words from Cardinal Ratzinger's 1969 commentary on section 16 of
Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World:
Over the pope as the expression of the binding claim of ecclesiastical authority there
still stands one's own conscience, which must be obeyed before all else, if necessary
even against the requirement of ecclesiastical authority. [The conscience ofthe indi-
vidual] confronts him with a supreme and ultimate tribunal[,] which in the last resort
is beyond the claim of external social groups, even ofthe official church. 'S
Cardinal John Henry Newman expressed much the same idea in a
frequently quoted line from his Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk: "Certain-
ly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts ... I shall
drink - to the Pope, if you please, - still to Conscience fIrst, and to the
Pope afterwards."16 For Newman, conscience comes fIrst; conscience
has primacy. But, properly understood, the authority of the pope and
the primacy of conscience are not in opposition to one another, because
"~,.:. both the pope and the individuaYs conscience are striving to know the
truth. We cannot affirm the primacy of conscience apart from this
affirmation of the centrality of truth.17
14 DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM '113 (emphasis added).
15 Joseph Ratzinger, Commentary on the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, in vol. 5 Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, at 134 (Herbert
Vorgrimler, ed., 1969).
16 Quoted in Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, at 23.
I71d. at 24; see also GULA, REASON INFORMED By FAITH, at 153 (both conscience and
authority seek the truth).
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Within the tradition, the obligation to follow one's conscience means
that one must follow' the certain judgment of one's conscience, even
though that judgment might turn out objectively to be in error. AB I
noted earlier, St. Thomas taught that a person who ignores the judg-
ment of his conscience is slighting the judgment of God. Thomas came
to that conclusion in the course of answering the following question: is
a mistaken conscience binding? Thomas answered, "Yes," a mistaken
conscience is binding, although the person might in fact be culpable for
making a mistake as a result of failing properly to have formed his
conscience. 1S The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World put St. Thomas's idea into these words: "Conscience frequently
errs from invincible ignorance without losing its dignity. The same
cannot be said of a man who cares but little for truth and goodness, or
of a conscience which by degrees grows practically sightless as a result
of habitual sin.,,19
This brings us to the question of what proper conscience formation
involves. In section 17 of the Forming Consciences statement, the
bishops make it clear that "Catholics have a serious and life-long obli-
gation to form their consciences in accord with human reason and the
teaching of the church.,,20 They then go on in section 18 to explain that
the process of conscience formation involves several elements. First,
and most fundamentally, we must cultivate a desire to embrace good-
ness and truth. The bishops state that, "[f]or Catholics this [desire to
embrace goodness and truth] begins with a willingness and openness to
seek the truth and what is right by studying sacred Scripture and the
teaching of the church." In addition, the bishops note that it is "impor-
tant to examine the facts and background information" that are rele-
vant to deciding how we ought to act with respect to the various public
policy choices that we face. The bishops also emphasize that "prayerful
reflection is essential to discern the will of God." Finally, our process of
conscience formation must humbly recognize that the failure to live up
to the obligation to form our consciences can lead us to make erroneous
judgments. The bishops suggest a number of factors that can lead
to errors of judgment about moral conduct, including "[i]gnorance
of Christ and his gospel, bad example given by others, enslavement
to one's passions, assertion of a mistaken notion of autOJ;lOmy of con-
science, rejection of the church's authority and her teaching, [and] a
lack of conversion and charity.,,21
18 SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5-6.
19 PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD '[16.
20 FCFC '[17, at 392.
21 [d. at 400 n. 2 (quoting CCC '[1792).
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Notice that the bishops highlight a "mistaken notion of the autonomy
of conscience" as a potential source of error. The problem is not the
primacy of conscience, but a mistaken notion of the autonomy of con-
science. We each have to commit ourselves to forming for ourselves
right and true judgments of conscience, but we cannot form our con-
sciences by ourselves.22 It is also important to keep in mind that good
conscience formation is rooted in questions of character formation be-
fore it ever gets to more particular questions about what one should do
in a particular situation.23 The way in which I approach more particu-
lar moral questions will flow out of the way in which I answer founda-
tional questions of character: what sort of a person do I really want to
be? Do I have a desire to be open to the truth, no matter where the
truth might lead me? Am I open to the ways in which all my various
relationships offamily and friendship shape me? Am I attentive to the
ways in which the culture around me shapes me? Is my sense of who I
am rooted in my desire to be a faithful disciple of Jesus? To what extent
is the core of my identity shaped by my participation in the life of the
church? Do I allow my imagination and way of seeing the world to be
shaped by the scriptural and liturgical life of the church? Have I
thought about why it is important for me to take seriously what the
church teaches about various issues? Do I have a genuine desire to be a
person of integrity, and do I understand what integrity demands ofme?
Formation on this foundational level of conscience is critical. In Con-
science and Truth, Cardinal Ratzinger noted that we can allow the foun-
dational moral sense that lies at the heart of our humanity and our
capacity for self-criticism to fall silent, which is a dangerous and dehu-
manizing "sickness of the soul.,,24 Cardinal Ratzinger states that "[ilt is
never wrong to follow the convictions one has arrived at - in fact, one
must do so." But even though the erroneous conscious is binding, Cardi-
nal Ratzinger explained that "it can very well be wrong to have come to
such askew convictions in the first place, by having stifled the protest
of [conscience]. The guilt lies then in a [deeper place,l in the neglect of
my being which made me deaf to the internal promptings oftruth.,,25
Conscience formation also demands that we ask hard questions about
what is really going on in a situation that calls for decision, what the
22 GULA, supra note 6, at 124 ("[A] criterion of a mature conscience is the ability to
make up one's mind for oneseifabout what ought to be done. Note: the criterion says for
oneself, not by oneself. The mature conscience is formed and exercised in community in
dialogue with other sources of moral wisdom.").
23Id. at 137.
24 Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, 18-19, 20-2l.
25Id. at 38.
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consequences in the world might actually be of acting in one way or
another, and what the available alternatives for action might really be.
Are my eyes open to what is really happening? Am I open to bringing
the exercise of reason to bear by asking all the relevant questions about
a situation that calls for moral action? "[T]he properly informed con-
science sees [reality] rightly. Do we see what is really there? Or do we
just see what we want to see?,,26
The bishops' Forming Consciences statement calls Catholics to form
their consciences "in accord with human reason and the teaching of the
church.,,27 Church teaching is thus "a very important, though not ex-
clusive, factor in the formation of conscience and in one's moral judg-
ment.,,2S Catholics who take their faith seriously should care deeply
about what the church says regarding the moral principles that relate
to questions of public policy. We should listen carefully to church teach-
ing, because it is our conviction that Christ will not abandon his church
to error in those things that are essential to our salvation. "We believe
that the Holy Spirit dwells within the whole church to guide and illu-
mine its actions," and this trust "grounds our expectation that those"
given the ministry of authoritative teaching within the church "can
discern the Spirit and, when [they are] faithfully following the Spirit,
do not lead the church astray.,,29
We also recognize that the Spirit-guided teaching of the church is
based on a wealth of moral resources, expertise, and centuries of reflec-
tion on human experience which "are too many and too complex for any
one person to understand and use well in making a decision.,,3o We can
have more confidence in our judgment when we draw on the moral
wisdom of our co=unity, rather than trusting in our own limited
resources, wisdom, and experience.
At the same time, in thinking about the role that church teaching
plays in formation of conscience, we need to recognize that the church
teaches with different levels of definitiveness.31 Some church teaching
is understood to be infallible, definitive, and unchanging. This sort of
26 GULA1 supra note 6, at 147.
27 FCFC'lI17.
28 GULA, supra note 6, at 153.
29 Id. at 158.
30 Ibid.
31 See FCFC 'II33 ("The judgments and recommendations that we make as hishops on
specific issues do not carry the same moral authority as statements of universal moral
teachings."),
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teaching expresses the fundamentals of Catholic belief and calls for an
assent of faith. Examples of this sort of teaching would include the
articles of faith expressed in the Creed and foundational moral teach-
ings like the affirmation of God's unconditional love and the co=and
that we love God and love our neighbor.32 There are also good reasons
to think that the teaching of John Paul II in his encyclical Euangelium
Vitae confirming the grave i=orality ofthe direct and voluntary kill-
ing of human beings, abortion, and euthanasia was intended to invoke
the infallibility attributed to the teaching of the ordinary universal
magisterium.33
But most of the moral teaching of the Church isn't presented as
infallible in this way. How, then, should we think about the role to be
played in our formation of conscience by the authoritative but non-
infallible teaching of the church? This question was addressed at
Vatican II in section 25 of Lumen Gentium, the Council's Dogmatic
Constitution on the Church:
32 GULA, supra note 6, at 158.
33 See FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S.J., CREATIVE FIDELITY: WEIGHING AND INTERPRETING Docu·
MENTS OF THE MAOISTERIUM 159-60 (1996). See also John Paul II, Euangelium Vitae 'II'II57,
62, 65. Each of these sections ofEuangelium Vitae includes reference to the teaching of
the ordinary and universal magisterium, followed by a footnote citation to Lumen
Gentium 'II25. Fr. Snllivan explains that "[i]t is obvions that the reference is to the
following sentence" in Lumen Gentium:
Although individual bishops do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they do nevertheless
proclaim Christ's doctrine infallibly even when dispersed around the world, provided that
while maintaining the bond of communion among themselves and with Peter's successor, and
teaching authoritatively on a matter of faith and morals, they are in agreement that a
particular judgment is to be held definitively.
SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 155 (quoting Lumen Gentium 'II25). Fr. Sullivan concludes
that it is too soon to know whether the immorality of murder, abortion, and euthanasia
has been infallibly taught:
[AJ doctrine is not to be understood as infallibly taught, unless this fact is clearly established,
and such a fact can hardly be said to be "clearly established" unless there is a consensus of
Catholic theologians about it. It is too soon to know whether there will be the consensus that
would show that it is "clearly established" that the immorality of murder, abortion, and
euthanasia has been infallibly taught. What this would mean is that the church had taken
an irreversible stand on these issues. But that would apply only to the three propositions
which the encyclical declares are taught by the ordinary universal magisterium....To say
that the three principles affirmed in this encyclical have been infallibly taught would not
mean that infallible answers had now been given to the many questions that concern their
application.
Id. at 160.




In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the
faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent of the
soul. This religious submission of will and mind must be shown in a special way to
the authentic teaching authority of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not
speaking ex cathedra.34
What does the Council mean when it calls us to "religious submission
ofwiIl and mind" to the authoritative but non-infallible teaching ofthe
church? Francis Sullivan, S.J., an expert in the study of the teaching
authority of the church, has explained that "religious submission ofwill
and mind" calls us to renounce any attitude of obstinacy in our own
opinions and to adopt an attitude of docility toward the teaching of the
church. To renounce obstinacy is to reject any tendency that we might
have to close our minds to church teaching by refusing to give it a fair
hearing. Obstinacy is an attitude that simply says "I've made up my
own mind, don't bother me.,,35
In contrast to this improper attitude of obstinacy, docility refers to "a
willingness to be taught, a willingness to prefer another's judgment
to one's own when it is reasonable to do so." Fr. Sullivan explains that
"[d]ocility calls for an open attitude toward the official teaching, giving
it a fair hearing, doing one's best to appreciate the reasons in its favor,
so as to convince oneself of its truth, and thus facilitate one's intellectu-
al assent to it." In sum, "religious submission of will and mind" means
making "an honest and sustained effort to overcome any contrary opin-
ion I might have, and to achieve a sincere assent of my mind to th[e]
teaching.,,36 In the realm of non-infallible teaching, the church cannot
impose on conscience any further obligation than this.37
Vatican II also addressed the role of authoritative teaching in con-
science formation in section 14 of the Declaration on Religious Free-
dom. The Declaration explains that, "[i]n the formation of their
consciences, the Christian faithful ought carefully to attend to the sa-
cred and certain doctrine of the Church." The words "ought carefully to
attend" are crucial here. During the Council's debate on the Declara-
tion, a proposal was made to change this particular text. Instead of
saying, "ought carefully to attend to," the suggestion was made that
the text should say that the faithful "ought to form their consciences
according to" the teaching of the church. In response, the commission
34 Documents of Vatican II, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH '[25.
35 SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 164.
36 Ibid.
37 GULA, supra note 6, at 158.
,.t.
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in charge of preparing the text said this: "The proposed formula seems
excessively restrictive. The obligation binding on the faithful is suffi-
ciently expressed in the text as it stands."38 The [mal text approved by
the Council simply calls on the faithful, in the formation of their con-
sciences, to carefully attend to church teaching. Fr. Sullivan offers this
interpretation of the decision of the Council: "It seems to me that this
way of expressing the obligation of the faithful in the face of the moral
teaching of the magisterium leaves a certain amount of room for them
to exercise their personal judgment in the formation of their con-
sciences. This, I take it, is an expression of respect for the moral sense
of the faithful.,,39
Read in this way, section 14 of the Declaration on Religious Freedom
is a significant affirmation of the primacy of conscience. There are,
however, some voices in the church today who assert that we should
stop talking about the primacy of conscience. Cardinal George Pell, the
archbishop of Sydney, Australia, has repeatedly spoken out against
what he describes as "the so-called doctrine of the primacy of con-
science." He argues that this idea is incompatible with traditional
Catholic teaching.40 His objection to talk of the primacy of conscience
is intended to make two points. First, it is an effort to respond to his
sense that invocation of the primacy of conscience increasingly is being
used to justify whatever we would like to do, rather than to discern
what God wants us to do. Second, it is an attempt to make clear that
the truth and God's word have primacy, not conscience. Cardinal Pell
argues that the role of conscience is to discern the truth in particular
cases, but "[ilndividual conscience cannot confer the right to reject or
distort New Testament morality as affirmed or developed by the
Church.,,41
Cardinal Pell also seems to suggest that conscience formation can be
reduced to simply following the teaching of the church. He argues,
38 See SULLIVAN, supra note 33 1 at 169.
39Id. at 170. See also FRANK BRENNAN, S.J., ACTING ON CONSCIENCE 31 (2007) ("Consci-
entious Catholics would deviate from church teaching on moral issues only with deep
regret and after careful attention to the developing and changing situation, and only on
condition that they are satisfied that they have a greater command of the facts or of
their situation than the church authority issuing universal declarations faithful to a
constant tradition.")
40 CARDINAL GEORGE PELL1 GOD AND CAESAR: SELECTED ESSAYS ON RELIGION, POLITICS &
SOCIETY 160 (2007).
41 Id. at 161.
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[w]e cannot rely on our tastes in moral matters because we are all vulnerable to
acquiring the taste for immorality and egoism.... [W]hile we should follow a well-
formed conscience, a well~formed conscience is hard to achieve. And ifwe suspect-
as surely we all sometimes must - that our conscience is under-formed or mal-
formed in some area, then we should follow a reliable authority until such time as
we can correct our consciences. And for Catholics, the most reliable authority is the
Church."
I agree with Cardinal Pell's insistence that we must understand the
primacy. of conscience in connection with our obligation to seek the
truth and adhere to it. But I think it would be a profound mistake to
stop talking about the primacy of conscience. As the central Vatican II
texts on conscience indicate, affirming the dignity and primacy of con-
science says something of real importance about responsible person-
hood. If we really expect voters and public officials to make .'.
responsible, conscientious decisions about matters of public policy, we
should not suggest that proper formation of conscience is simply a
matter of falling into line with church teaching. Such an approach will
not contribute to the ability of Catholics in public life to make conscien-
tious decisions, because church teaching does not generally speak de-
finitively to the concrete questions that voters and public officials face.
Cardinal Pell's approach 'also seems to be in significant tension with
the discussion of conscience formation set forth in section 14 of the
Declaration on Religious Freedom. The sort of reliance on church au-
thority that Cardinal Pell proposes looks more like the approach to
conscience formation rejected by the Council in the text it finally
adopted. Catholics are obliged carefully attend 'to church teaching, not
to form their consciences according to church teaching. The method of
conscience formation suggested by Cardinal Pell is hard to reconcile
with the Declaration on Religious Freedom's insistence that human
dignity demands the exercise of responsible freedom: we are called both
to a respect for the moral order that is appropriately submissive to
authority and to come to decisions on our own judgment and in the
light of truth.43 We have a duty to seek the truth so that we may with
prudence form for ourselves right and true judgments of conscience,
using all suitable means.44
The conscience of Catholic public officials received significant atten-
tion in a document issued in November 2002 by the Vatican's Congre-
42 Cardinal George Pell, The Inconvenient Conscience, FIRST THINGS (May 2005),
at 24.
43 DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 'lIB.
44 DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 'II3.
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gation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The C.D.F.'s Doctrinal Note on
Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political
Life reminds Catholics involved in public life "that a well-formed Chris-
tian conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or an
individual law which contradicts the fundamental contents offaith and
morals."
The C.D.F.'s Doctrinal Note attempts to respond to public officials
who draw a sharp line between their personal moral beliefs as Catho-
lics and their public policy positions. In the face of the threat to moral
integrity presented by this sort of compartmentalization, the Doctrinal
Note provided a timely reminder that law and politics cannot be sepa-
rated from morality and truth.
This insistence that moral beliefs inform policy choices is, in the end,
a matter of integrity. It is, as the Doctrinal Note explains, a question of
our "duty to be morally coherent," a duty that is "found within one's
conscience, which is one and indivisible.',45 We do not lead parallel
moral lives that can be compartmentalized into separate spheres, one
spiritual and one secular: "Living and acting in conformity with one's
own conscience on questions ofpolitics is...the way in which Christians
offer their concrete contributions so that, through political life, society
will become more just and more consistent with the dignity of the
human person.',46
45 CONGREGATION ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE 'II6 (2002).
46 Doctrinal Note 1JI6. For further discussion of the separation of personal conscience
from public policy decisions, see Archbishop William J. Levada; Reflections on Catho-
lics in Political Life and the Reception of Holy Communion, 34 ORIGINS 101, 101-02
(July 1, 2004) ("Over the years since the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision,
the frustration of many Catholics, bishops among them, about Catholic politicians who
not only ignore church teaching on abortion but actively espouse a contrary position
has continued to grow."). Bryan Massingale describes two frustrations on the part of
the bishops. First, the bishops are frustrated by what they see as inconsistency be-
tween the expressed personal opposition to abortion by many Catholic politicians and
their failure to engage in public advocacy against abortion. The second source of frus-
tration is the assumptiou of many Catholic politicians (and members of the wider
public) that opposition to abortion amounts to the imposition of a sectarian moral code
on a pluralistic society. The bishops maintain that the church's opposition to abortion is
based on the natural moral law - lla common moral truth that spans religious affilia-
tions" - that can be recognized and embraced l'by all reasonable people of good will."
For the bishops, it is difficult to understand why a politician would hesitate to act on a
conviction that l'is an obvious conclusion of common morality," rather than a sectarian
position rooted in revelation. See Bryan Massingale, Catholic Participation in Political
Life, 35 ORIGINS 469, 472 (2005); see also Laurie Goodstein, Guiliani's Views on Abortion
Upset Catholic Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Juue 25, 2007, at A14 ("[CJhurch leaders say they
r'
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This understanding of the unity of conscience guides the Doctrinal
Note's teaching on the public official's grave and clear obligation to
oppose any law that attacks human life. Let's assume that a legislator
has reached the conscientious conclusion that abortion is a grave moral
evil because it constitutes an attack on the inviolable dignity of human
life. This conscientious conclusion is not simply a matter of personal
morality with no public import; it is a conviction of conscience that
should influence the way in which the legislator thinks about public
policy. As an attack on the fundamental right to life, abortion is con·
trary to justice and the common good. If a legislator wishes to live a life
of integrity and moral coherence, his or her participation in politics
should not be cut off from the conscientious judgment he or she has
made about the morality of abortion. Since a legislator's role is to craft
positive law that will best promote the common good, a legislator who .';
holds the conscientious conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil
has a corresponding duty to craft laws aimed at reducing the incidence
of abortion.
Pope Benedict has identified a broad set of fundamental values as,
<"not negotiable" .in making public policy decisions. These values that
are "not negotiable" include "respect for human life, its defense from
conception to natural death, the family built upon marriage between
a man and a woman, the freedom to educate one's children," and,
most broadly, "the promotion of the common good in all its forms.,,47
While these fundamental moral values are non·negotiable, translat·
ing those values irito specific public policy or voting decisions will
inevitably involve complex decision making. How, for example, a poli·
cy maker should go about striving to reduce the incidence of abortion
in contemporary American culture, under existing constitutional
constraints, and in the face of significant social disagreement with
regard to the underlying moral issue, is an exceptionally complicated
question.
Good lawmaking is never simply a matter of directly transposing
moral principles into rules of civil law. Drawing on a jurisprudential
tradition rooted in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, the Jesuit theolo·
are frustrated by prominent Catholic politicians like Mr. Guiliani who argue that while
they are personally opposed to abortion, they do not want to impose their beliefs on
others."); id. ("Archbishop John J. Meyers of Newark said ... 'To violate human life is
always and everywhere wrong. In fact, we don't think it's a matter of church teaching,
but a matter of the way God made the world, and it applies to everyone."').
47 Sacramentum Caritatis '.[83.
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gian John Courtney Murray explained that moral law and civil law are
essentially related, but necessarily differentiated:
Both the science and art ofjurisprudence and also the statesman's craft rest on the
differential character of law and morals, of legal experience and religious or moral
experience, of political unity and religious unity. The jurist's work proceeds from
the axiom that the principles of religion or morality cannot be transgressed, but
neither can they be immediately translated into civilized human law. There is an
intermediate step, the inspection of circumstances and the consideration of ... the
public advantage to be found, or not found, in transforming a moral or religious
principle into a compulsory rule for general enforcement upon society.48
This intermediate step - the careful inspection of circumstances - is
the work of the virtue of prudence. While Catholics must not support
policies that compromise or undermine a fundamental ethical value or
constitute formal cooperation with evil,49 the Doctrinal Note recognized
48 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XlII and Pius XlI: Government and the Order of
Religion, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 59-60 (Leon Hooper,
S.J., ed., 1993) (emphasis added); see CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH,
DONUM VITAE, PART 111, supra note 32, Part 111 ("The intervention of the public authority
must be inspired by the rational principles which regulate the relationships between
civil law and moral law. [The civil law] must sometimes tolerate, for the sake of public
order, things which it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting."); R. Mary Hayden
Le=ons, Juridical Prudence and the Toleration ofEvil: Aquinas and John Paul II, 4
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 24, 28-29 (2006) ("A certain degree of harm must be tolerated,
otherwise the burden on those not yet virtuous would be so unbearable that they 'would
break out into yet greater evils."') (quoting Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-11, Q.
96 Art. 2, reply to objection 2); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., John Paul II, John Courtney
Murray, and the Relationship between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Pro-
posal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGlIT 231, 253-58,
263-64, 266-67 (2004); M. Cathleen Kaveny, The Limits of Ordinary Virtue: The Limits
of the Criminal Law in Implementing Evangelium Vitae, in CHOOSING LIFE: A DIALOGUE
ON EVANGELIUM VITAE 132-49 (K. Wildes & A. Mitchell, eds., 1997); see also James L.
Heft, S.M., Religion and Politics: The Catholic Contribution, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29,
42 (2006) (''[I]t is necessary for all Catholics, and for Catholic legislators, to agree with
the Church's moral teaching on abortion. But I also find it not so clear when it comes to
how best to translate that moral teaching into civil law in a society where only one-
fourth of the popnlation is Catholic, and when Catholics are not all of one mind on how
to deal with Roe v. Wade . .. , [T]he bishops shonld be more helpful to legislators by
acknowledging the complexities of the decisions they need to make on legislative mat-
ters related to moral issues."); John Langan, S.J., Observations on Abortion and Poli-
tics, 191 AMERICA, 9, 11 (Oct. 25, 2004) ("[T]he enactment of any prohibition of abortion
is not simply the enunciation of a moral truth; it is a political and legal act which is to
be carried out in an arena where there are many conflicting points of view and inter-
ests and where there is widespread hostility to the pro-life position.").
49 See FCFC '11'1122 & 34; Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Catholics in Public Life: Judges,
Legislators, and Voters 46 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES 211, 230-38 (2007) (dis-
cussing cooperation analysis).
that there can be "a variety of strategies available for accomplishing or
guaranteeing the same fundamental value." Indeed, the note specifical-
ly states that the church's efforts to educate the consciences of the
faithful do not reflect a desire on the part of the church "to exercise
political power or eliminate freedom of opinion of Catholics regarding
contingent questions.,,5o




Deciding how best to promote fundamental moral values through
civil legislation that will truly function as good law promoting the
co=on good in all its forms under the concrete conditions of a given
society is always a contingent question that calls upon those in public
life to exercise the virtue of prudence.51 Deciding whom to vote for in
an election calls upon all citizens to exercise the virtue of prudence. In
section 19 of their Forming Consciences statement, the bishops remind
us that prudence "enables us 'to discern our true good in every circum-
stance and to choose the right means of achieving it.' Prudence shapes
and informs our ability to deliberate over available alternatives, to
determine what is most fitting to a specific context and to act decisive-
ly.,,52 "It is prudence that i=ediately guides the judgment of con-
science" and helps us to "apply moral principles to particular cases."53
50 Doctrinal Note, '[6 (emphasis added).
51 See Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., American Catholics and the State, AMERICA
(August 2-9, 2004), at 17. See also Lemmons, supra note 48 (discussing the principles
of juridical prudence that inform conscientious legislating); KalscheuT, Relationship
between Civil Law and Moral Law, supra note 48, at 255-57; John Langan, S.J., Homily
for Fr. Robert Drinan's Funeral, 36 ORIGINS 556, 557 (February 15,2007) ("The shape of
legislation can be a matter for prudential disagreement, not an issue of faithfulness.");
Anthony Fisher, O.P., The Duties ofa Catholic Politician with Respect to Bio-Lawmak-
ing, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETmcs & PUBLIC Por}y 89, 118-19 (2006) (discussing the virtue
of political prudence); id. at 121 (''We must ...be loathe to judge our confreres who
differ from us on prudential matters in the battle against abortion and euthanasia);
Archbishop John Quinn, The Virtue ofPrudence and the Spectrum of Issues Affecting
Human Dignity, 34 ORIGINS 334, 335 (Nov. 4, 2004) ("It is fitting to bring into our
Catholic consciousness the tradition of prudence in the church's teaching, with its
probing question, What will make the situation better rather than worse for the protec-
tion of life in the full array ofits claims? To lose sight of the full spectrum of issues
which affect human digoity runs the grave risk of playing into the hands of those who
are eager to allege that the pro-life stance is a sectarian issue."). For a helpful discus-
sion of the nuanced, contextual operation of the virtue of prudence, see Robert K.
Vischer, Professional Identity and the Contours of Prudence, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 46,
50-52 (2007).
52 FCFC '[19 (quoting CCC '[1806).
53 CCC '[1806. Prudence is a moral virtue "acquired by human effort. [It is] the fruit
and seed of morally good acts." CCC #1804. As the fruit ofgood acts, its acquisition may
in part grow through a process of trial and error which helps us to learn through
experience the difference between good and bad acts.
.~ .
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The virtue of prudence demands that we ask, what is the best that is
possible to achieve now, not what is the best that we might hope to
achieve in an ideal world that does not exist?54 Guided by the virtue of
prudence, the process of conscience formation is appropriately atten-
tive to the limits of what it might be possible for the law to accomplish
under existing social, political, and constitutional conditions.55
As the bishops note in their statement, the process offraming legisla-
tion is "subject to prudential judgment and 'the art of the possible."'56
John Paul II provided an example of prudence at work in his encyclical
Evangelium Vitae where he explained,
when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an
elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well
known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a
law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and
public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust
law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.57
The work of John Courtney Murray offers a related example of the
virtue of prudence at work. Murray explained that the Catholic tradi-
tion of jurisprudence recognizes that the law should not be used to
prohibit a given moral evil unless that prohibition can be shown to be
something that the law is capable of addressing prudently. Following
St. Thomas, Murray argued that human law must be framed with a
view to the level of virtue that it is actually possible to expect from the
people required to comply with the law.
Accordingly, Murray suggested a series of questions that the legisla-
tor must consider in assessing the prudence of a proposed law: Will the
54 Massingale, supra note 46 ("Prudence ... seeks not the absolute best, but the best
that can be attained for now.").
55 See Lemmons, supra note 48.
56 FCFC'lI32.
57 Evangelium Vitae, l}I73; see also John Finnis, Restricting Legalised Abortion is Not
Intrinsically Unjust, in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN HEALTH-
CARE, SCIENCE, LAw AND PUBLIC POLICY (Helen Watt, ed., 2005), at 109, 209-45 (discussing
the meaning ofEuangelim Vitae 'lI73 and the complexity of determining when a law in
fact is an intrinsically unjust law permitting abortion). Finnis argues that a provision
is "permissive" of abortion and intrinsically unjust "only if it has the legal meaning and
effect of reducing the state's legal protection of the unborn." Id. at 209; see also id. at
233 (consideration of the legal and legislative context and circumstances that give rise
to alaw, as well as a legislator's intent in voting for the law, are relevant to assessing
whether the law's meaning and effect are "permissive" as that term is used in Evange-
lium Vitae 'lI73).
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prohibition be obeyed, at least by most people? Is it enforceable against
the disobedient? Is it prudent to enforce this ban, given the possibility
of harmful effects in other areas of social life? Is the instrumentality of
a coercive law a good means for the eradication of the targeted social
evil? And since a law that usually fails is not a good means, what are
the lessons of experience with this sort of legal prohibition? If legisla-
tion is to be properly crafted from a moral point of view with the goal of
promoting the common good of society, these are the questions that a
public official exercising the virtue of prudence must answer.58
So, what does a commitment to the primacy of conscience mean for
Catholics striving to be faithful citizens in today's pluralistic, demo-
cratic society? A commitment to the primacy of conscience calls us to
strive for moral integrity and an undivided conscience. It demands that "_
we dedicate ourselves to a life-long process of conscience formation,
rooted in a commitment to truth, and carefully attending to the teach-
ing of the church and the insights of human reason as we strive to form
for ourselves right and true judgments of conscience. It recognizes that
decisions in public life call for the exercise of the balancing virtue of-
prudence, always asking what will best promote the common good in
all its dimensions through the concrete decision that must be made in
the context of the reality that exists right now.59 It acknowledges that
prudence may suggest to different conscientious decision makers a
variety of strategies available for accomplishing or guaranteeing the
58 See BRENNAN, supra note 39, at 73: Simply characterizing something as a grave
moral disorder does not help us to determine whether there should be a law against it,
especially when there is no moral consensus on the issue in the community. "At election
time, we all need to distinguish three discrete questions: Is something a grave moral
disorder? Should there be a law against it? Is this the best way to work for a change in
public understanding and commitment, providing some prospect for legislative change
leading to a change in people's thinking and actions?" Prudent policy mak.i:q.g will also
be attentive to what Mary Ann Glendon characterizes as the priority of culture over
law. Law will be of limited usefulness in protecting human dignity if legal norms don't
find support in the underlying cultore. See Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations ofHuman
Rights: The Unfinished Business, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS, at 331-32 (Sca-
perlanda and Collett, Eds., 2007).- Cultural renewal may need to precede effective
lawmaking. "[Plersonal formation is essential to cultural formation and ... no program
for advancing the common good is secure unless it rests on firm cultural foundations."
In the words of John Paul II, "the dignity of the individual must be safegnarded by
custom before the law can do so." Mary Ann Glendon, Catholic Thought and Dilemmas
for Human Rights, in HIGHER LEARNING & CATHOUC TRADITIONS, at 120 (Robert E. Sullivan,
ed., 2001). Without denying the genuine pedagogic function of law, attentiveness in
conscience formation to the need for this bottom-up approach may lead prudence to
recognize that we shouldn't expect too much from the law too soon.
S9 See Archbishop Quinn, The Virtue ofPrudence, supra note 51.
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same fundamental value. And in the midst of often deep moral dis-
agreement in our society, respect for the primacy of conscience calls us
to engage in the respectful dialogue that is essential if we are to join
together with our fellow citizens in an authentic search for truth,60
forming hearts and minds committed to making choices that will pro-
tect human dignity and promote the common good.
60 Cr. PASTORAL CONSITrUTION ON THE CHuRCH IN THE MODERN WORLD, 'lI16; see also BREN.
NAN, supra note 39, at 223 (''Insistence on the primacy of church authority in the public
forum has a chilling effect on aoy humble aod open inquiry into truth when the majority of
interlocutors are not subject to that church authority.").
